The impact of managerial overconfidence on expenses asymmetric behavior

Document Type : Original Article

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Abstract

This study investigated the impact of managerial overconfidence on asymmetric behavior of general, administrative and sale expenses with corporate governance, economic and agency variables in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). To measure managerial overconfidence used model of assets and sale growth. corporate governance variables are free cash flow, CEO tenure, CEO horizon and CEO bouns; economic variables are asset intensity, successive revenue decreases and stock performance; and agency variables are board size, independent board and institutional ownership. The study sample consists of 125 firms studied between 1383 to 1392. To test the hypothesis used panel data and multivariate regression models. Results shows that there are asymmetric behavior of general, administrative and sale expenses, and managerial overconfidence increases the severity of cost stickness. After controlling corporate governance, economic and agency variables, didn't have find significant relationship between managerial overconfidence and severity of cost stickness.

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